Telling the other what one knows? Strategic lying in a modified acquiring-a-company experiment with two-sided private information

Andrej Angelovski, Daniela Cagno (), Werner Güth () and Francesca Marazzi
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Daniela Cagno: LUISS Guido Carli
Werner Güth: LUISS Guido Carli

Theory and Decision, 2020, vol. 88, issue 1, No 6, 97-119

Abstract: Abstract Lying for a strategic advantage is to be expected in commercial interactions. But would this be more or less obvious when lying could come from either party and question mutually profitable exchange? To explore this, we modify the acquiring-a-company game (Samuelson and Bazerman in Res Exp Econ 3:105–138, 1985) by letting both, buyer and seller, be privately informed. Specifically, the value of the company for the buyer is known only by the seller; whereas, only the buyer is aware by which proportion the sellers evaluation is lower than that of the buyer. Before bargaining, both parties can reveal what they know via cheap-talk numerical messages. Game theoretically, the pooling equilibrium may or may not allow for trade depending on the commonly known expected evaluation discrepancy. By mutually revealing what one knows, one could boost trade and efficiency. Although strategic misreporting prevails quite generally, it is higher for sellers throughout the experiment. Regarding gender, women misreport less, especially as sellers, and offer higher prices.

Keywords: Bargaining; Private information; Cheap talk; Acquiring-a-company game (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Working Paper: Telling the Other What One Knows? Strategic Lying in a Modi ed Acquiring-a-Company Experiment with Two-sided Private Information (2018)
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DOI: 10.1007/s11238-019-09715-6

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