Quasi-stationary social welfare functions

Sususmu Cato ()

Theory and Decision, 2020, vol. 89, issue 1, No 4, 85-106

Abstract: Abstract This paper examines collective decision-making with an infinite-time horizon setting. First, we establish a result on the collection of decisive sets: if there are at least four alternatives and Arrow’s axioms are satisfied on the selfish domain, then the collection of decisive sets forms an ultrafilter. Second, we impose generalized versions of stationarity axiom for social preferences, which are substantially weaker than the standard version. We show that if any of our generalized versions are satisfied in addition to Arrow’s axioms, then some generation is dictatorial. Moreover, we specify a very weak stationarity axiom that guarantees a possibility result.

Keywords: Arrow’s impossibility theorem; Stationarity; Quasi-stationarity: Pareto principle; Ultrafilter (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kap:theord:v:89:y:2020:i:1:d:10.1007_s11238-020-09746-4

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DOI: 10.1007/s11238-020-09746-4

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