EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Equilibrium as compatibility of plans

Marek Hudik

Theory and Decision, 2020, vol. 89, issue 3, No 5, 349-368

Abstract: Abstract This paper uses a game-theoretic framework to formalize the Hayekian notion of equilibrium as the compatibility of plans. To do so, it imposes more structure on the conventional model of strategic games. For each player, it introduces goals, goal-oriented strategies, and the goals’ probabilities of success, from which players’ payoffs are derived. The differences between the compatibility of plans and Nash equilibrium are identified and discussed. Furthermore, it is shown that the notion of compatibility of plans, in general, differs from the notion of Pareto efficiency. Since the compatibility of plans across all players can rarely be achieved in reality, a measurement is introduced to determine various degrees of plan compatibility. Several possible extensions and applications of the model are discussed.

Keywords: Goals; Plans; Goal-oriented strategies; Hayekian equilibrium; Compatibility of plans; Nash equilibrium; Pareto efficiency (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Downloads: (external link)
http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s11238-020-09753-5 Abstract (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kap:theord:v:89:y:2020:i:3:d:10.1007_s11238-020-09753-5

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer. ... ry/journal/11238/PS2

DOI: 10.1007/s11238-020-09753-5

Access Statistics for this article

Theory and Decision is currently edited by Mohammed Abdellaoui

More articles in Theory and Decision from Springer
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().

 
Page updated 2025-03-30
Handle: RePEc:kap:theord:v:89:y:2020:i:3:d:10.1007_s11238-020-09753-5