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Rank-dominant strategy and sincere voting

Yasunori Okumura

Theory and Decision, 2021, vol. 90, issue 1, No 6, 117-145

Abstract: Abstract This study considers a voting rule wherein each player sincerely votes when he/she has no information about the preferences of the other players. We introduce the concept of rank-dominant strategies to discuss the situation where a player is completely ignorant in the preferences of the other players and decision theoretic justification of the concept. We show that under the plurality voting rule with the equal probability random tie-breaking, sincere voting is always the rank-dominant strategy of each voter. We also discuss other scoring rules and show that sincere voting may not be a rank-dominant strategy of a voter even with the equal probability random tie-breaking.

Keywords: Mechanism design; Voting; Sincere voting; Uncertainty; Choquet expected utility (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
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DOI: 10.1007/s11238-020-09771-3

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