Set and revealed preference axioms for multi-valued choice

Hans Peters and Panos Protopapas

Theory and Decision, 2021, vol. 90, issue 1, No 2, 29 pages

Abstract: Abstract We consider choice correspondences that assign a subset to every choice set of alternatives, where the total set of alternatives is an arbitrary finite or infinite set. We focus on the relations between several extensions of the condition of independence of irrelevant alternatives on one hand, and conditions on the revealed preference relation on sets, notably the weak axiom of revealed preference, on the other hand. We also establish the connection between the condition of independence of irrelevant alternatives and so-called strong sets; the latter characterize a social choice correspondence satisfying independence of irrelevant alternatives.

Keywords: Revealed preference axioms; Multi-valued choice; Independence of irrelevant alternatives; Strong sets (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
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DOI: 10.1007/s11238-020-09774-0

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