A strategic justification of the constrained equal awards rule through a procedurally fair multilateral bargaining game

Makoto Hagiwara and Shunsuke Hanato

Theory and Decision, 2021, vol. 90, issue 2, No 4, 233-243

Abstract: Abstract We propose a new game to strategically justify the constrained equal awards rule in claims problems. Our game is “procedurally fair” (claimants are treated equally) and “multilateral” (all claimants negotiate simultaneously). In addition, even if claimants cannot reach an agreement in any period, they can renegotiate in the next period. We show that, for each claims problem, the awards vector chosen by the constrained equal awards rule achieved at period 1 is the unique subgame perfect equilibrium outcome of the game.

Keywords: Strategic justification; Claims problem; Constrained equal awards rule; Nash program (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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DOI: 10.1007/s11238-020-09782-0

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