Organizational refinements of Nash equilibrium

Takashi Kamihigashi, Kerim Keskin and Çağrı Sağlam

Theory and Decision, 2021, vol. 91, issue 3, No 1, 289-312

Abstract: Abstract Strong Nash equilibrium (see Aumann, 1959) and coalition-proof Nash equilibrium (see Bernheim et al., 1987) rely on the idea that players are allowed to form coalitions and make joint deviations. Both of these notions consider cases in which any coalition can be formed. Accordingly, there may arise “conflicts of interest” that prevent a player from choosing an action that simultaneously meets the requirements of two coalitions to which he or she belongs. Here, we address this observation by studying an organizational framework such that the coalitional structure is (i) motivated by real-life examples where players cannot form some coalitions and (ii) formulated in such a way that no conflicts of interest remain. We define an organization as an ordered collection of partitions of the player set such that any partition is coarser than the partitions that precede it. For any given organization, we introduce the notion of organizational Nash equilibrium. We analyze the existence of equilibrium in a subclass of games with strategic complementarities and illustrate how the proposed notion refines the set of Nash equilibria in some examples of normal form games.

Keywords: Nash equilibrium; Refinements; Coalitional structure; Organizational structure; Games with strategic complementarities; C72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
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Working Paper: Organizational Refinements of Nash Equilibrium (2017)
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DOI: 10.1007/s11238-021-09812-5

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