EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Strategic manipulation in judgment aggregation under higher-level reasoning

Zoi Terzopoulou () and Ulle Endriss
Additional contact information
Zoi Terzopoulou: University of Amsterdam
Ulle Endriss: University of Amsterdam

Theory and Decision, 2022, vol. 92, issue 2, No 5, 363-385

Abstract: Abstract We analyse the incentives of individuals to misrepresent their truthful judgments when engaged in collective decision-making. Our focus is on scenarios in which individuals reason about the incentives of others before choosing which judgments to report themselves. To this end, we introduce a formal model of strategic behaviour in logic-based judgment aggregation that accounts for such higher-level reasoning as well as the fact that individuals may only have partial information about the truthful judgments and preferences of their peers. We find that every aggregation rule must belong to exactly one of three possible categories: it is either (i) immune to strategic manipulation for every level of reasoning, or (ii) manipulable for every level of reasoning, or (iii) immune to manipulation only for every kth level of reasoning, for some natural number k greater than 1.

Keywords: Social choice theory; Judgment aggregation; Voting; Manipulation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: Track citations by RSS feed

Downloads: (external link)
http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s11238-021-09833-0 Abstract (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kap:theord:v:92:y:2022:i:2:d:10.1007_s11238-021-09833-0

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer. ... ry/journal/11238/PS2

DOI: 10.1007/s11238-021-09833-0

Access Statistics for this article

Theory and Decision is currently edited by Mohammed Abdellaoui

More articles in Theory and Decision from Springer
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().

 
Page updated 2022-05-12
Handle: RePEc:kap:theord:v:92:y:2022:i:2:d:10.1007_s11238-021-09833-0