Sharing the surplus and proportional values
Zhengxing Zou (),
René Brink () and
Yukihiko Funaki ()
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Zhengxing Zou: Beijing Jiaotong University
René Brink: Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam
Yukihiko Funaki: Waseda University
Theory and Decision, 2022, vol. 93, issue 1, No 8, 185-217
Abstract We introduce a family of proportional surplus division values for TU-games. Each value first assigns to each player a compromise between her stand-alone worth and the average stand-alone worths over all players, and then allocates the remaining worth among the players in proportion to their stand-alone worths. This family contains the proportional division value and the new egalitarian proportional surplus division value as two special cases. We provide characterizations for this family of values, as well as for each single value in this family.
Keywords: Cooperative game; Proportional value; Surplus sharing; Axiomatization; Balanced contributions (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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