A theory of unanimous jury voting with an ambiguous likelihood

Simona Fabrizi (), Steffen Lippert, Addison Pan () and Matthew Ryan ()
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Addison Pan: Xi’an Jiaotong-Liverpool University, International Business School Suzhou (IBSS), Business Building (BS)
Matthew Ryan: AUT

Theory and Decision, 2022, vol. 93, issue 3, No 1, 399-425

Abstract: Abstract We examine collective decision-making in a jury voting game under the unanimity rule when voters have ambiguous beliefs. Unlike in existing studies (Ellis in Theoretical Economics 11:865–895, 2016; Fabrizi et al., in: AUT Economics Working Paper, 2021; Ryan in Theory and Decision 90:543–577, 2021), the locus of ambiguity is the likelihood function (signal precision) rather than the prior. This significantly alters the properties of symmetric equilibria. While prior ambiguity may induce multiple equilibria (Fabrizi et al., in: AUT Economics Working Paper, 2021; Ryan in Theory and Decision 90:543–577, 2021) we show that, under likelihood ambiguity, there exists a unique non-trivial symmetric responsive equilibrium that takes the same form as in the absence of ambiguity (Feddersen and Pesendorfer in The American Political Science Review 92:23–35, 1998). Moreover, likelihood ambiguity partially offsets the pernicious effects of pivotality on decision quality: the frequency of Type I error (convicting the innocent) is typically lower than in the absence of ambiguity.

Keywords: Ambiguity; Voting; Belief updating; Pivotality (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D7 D81 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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DOI: 10.1007/s11238-021-09857-6

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