Buck-passing dumping in a garbage-dumping game
Takaaki Abe ()
Additional contact information
Takaaki Abe: Tokyo Institute of Technology
Theory and Decision, 2022, vol. 93, issue 3, No 5, 509-533
Abstract We study stable strategy profiles in a pure exchange game of bads, where each player dumps his or her bads such as garbage onto someone else. Hirai et al. (Mathematical Social Sciences 51(2):162–170, 2006) show that cycle dumping, in which each player follows an ordering and dumps his or her bads onto the next player, is a strong Nash equilibrium and that self-disposal is $$\alpha $$ α -stable for some initial distributions of bads. In this paper, we show that a strategy profile of bullying, in which all players dump their bads onto a single player, becomes $$\alpha $$ α -stable for every exchange game of bads. We also provide a necessary and sufficient condition for a strategy profile to be $$\alpha $$ α -stable in an exchange game of bads. In addition, we show that repeating an exchange after the first exchange makes self-disposal stationary.
Keywords: Bads; Dumping; Exchange; Stability (search for similar items in EconPapers)
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s11238-021-09858-5 Abstract (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kap:theord:v:93:y:2022:i:3:d:10.1007_s11238-021-09858-5
Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer. ... ry/journal/11238/PS2
Access Statistics for this article
Theory and Decision is currently edited by Mohammed Abdellaoui
More articles in Theory and Decision from Springer
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().