Matching with contracts: calculation of the complete set of stable allocations
Eliana Pepa Risma ()
Theory and Decision, 2022, vol. 93, issue 3, No 3, 449-461
Abstract For a many-to-many matching model with contracts, where all the agents have substitutable preferences, we provide an algorithm to compute the full set of stable allocations. This is based on the lattice structure of such set.
Keywords: Matching; Contracts; Full set; Stable allocations (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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