Optimization implementation of solution concepts for cooperative games with stochastic payoffs

Panfei Sun (), Dongshuang Hou () and Hao Sun ()
Additional contact information
Panfei Sun: Northwestern Polytechnical University
Dongshuang Hou: Northwestern Polytechnical University
Hao Sun: Northwestern Polytechnical University

Theory and Decision, 2022, vol. 93, issue 4, No 5, 724 pages

Abstract: Abstract In this paper, we study solution concepts for cooperative games with stochastic payoffs. we define four kinds of solution concepts, namely the most coalitional (marginal) stable solution and the fairest coalitional (marginal) solution, by minimizing the total variance of excesses of coalitions (individual players). All these four concepts are optimal solutions of corresponding optimal problem under the least square criterion. It turns out that the fairest coalitional (marginal) solution belongs to the set of the most coalitional (marginal) stable solutions. Inspired by the definition of nucleolus, we propose various extended nucleolus based on lexicographic criterion. Furthermore, axiomatizations of the proposed solutions are exhibited through the linkage between the stochastic and deterministic models.

Keywords: Game theory; Solution concept; Stochastic payoffs; Optimization; Nucleolus; Axiomatization (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s11238-022-09865-0 Abstract (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kap:theord:v:93:y:2022:i:4:d:10.1007_s11238-022-09865-0

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer. ... ry/journal/11238/PS2

DOI: 10.1007/s11238-022-09865-0

Access Statistics for this article

Theory and Decision is currently edited by Mohammed Abdellaoui

More articles in Theory and Decision from Springer
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().