When punishers might be loved: fourth-party choices and third-party punishment in a delegation game

Yuzhen Li, Jun Luo (), He Niu () and Hang Ye ()
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Yuzhen Li: Zhejiang University of Finance and Economics
Jun Luo: Zhejiang University of Finance and Economics
He Niu: Zhejiang University of Finance and Economics
Hang Ye: Zhejiang University of Finance and Economics

Theory and Decision, 2023, vol. 94, issue 3, No 4, 423-465

Abstract: Abstract Third-party punishment (TPP) has been shown to be an effective mechanism for maintaining human cooperation. However, it is puzzling how third-party punishment can be maintained, as punishers take on personal costs to punish defectors. Although there is evidence that punishers are preferred as partners because third-party punishment is regarded by bystanders as a costly signal of trustworthiness, other studies show that this signaling value of punishment can be severely attenuated because third-party helping is viewed as a stronger signal of trustworthiness than third-party punishment. Third-party helpers donate their payoffs to victims of defection in games instead of punishing defectors as third-party punishers do. Then, under what circumstances can third-party punishment be maintained by costly signaling when helping is also present? We show that punishers are preferred over helpers by fourth-party individuals as their delegates to deter potential exploitation. This suggests that costly signaling can facilitate the maintenance of third-party punishment in partner choice with delegation interactions.

Keywords: Third-party punishment; Costly signaling; Delegation game (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
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DOI: 10.1007/s11238-022-09897-6

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