On the strong $$\beta$$ β -hybrid solution of an N-person game
Bertrand Crettez (),
Rabia Nessah () and
Tarik Tazdaït
Additional contact information
Bertrand Crettez: Université Paris-Panthéon-Assas, CRED
Rabia Nessah: IESEG School of Management, LEM, CNRS
Theory and Decision, 2023, vol. 94, issue 3, No 1, 363-377
Abstract:
Abstract We propose a new notion of coalitional equilibria, the strong $$\beta$$ β -hybrid solution, which is a refinement of the hybrid solution introduced by Zhao. Zhao’s solution is well suited to study situations where people cooperate within coalitions but where coalitions compete with one another. This paper’s solution, as opposed to the hybrid solution, assigns to each coalition a strategy profile that is strongly Pareto optimal. Moreover, like the $$\beta$$ β -core, deviations by subcoalitions of any existing coalition are deterred by the threat of a unique counter-strategy available to the non-deviating players. Zhao proved the existence of existence of strong $$\beta$$ β -hybrid solution for transferable utility games with compact and convex strategy spaces and concave continuous payoff functions. Here, we extend his result to non-transferable utility games.
Keywords: $$\alpha$$ α -core; $$\beta$$ β -core; N-person game; Coalition structure; Hybrid solution; Strong hybrid solution (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:
Downloads: (external link)
http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s11238-022-09900-0 Abstract (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kap:theord:v:94:y:2023:i:3:d:10.1007_s11238-022-09900-0
Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer. ... ry/journal/11238/PS2
DOI: 10.1007/s11238-022-09900-0
Access Statistics for this article
Theory and Decision is currently edited by Mohammed Abdellaoui
More articles in Theory and Decision from Springer
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().