Asymmetric guessing games

Zafer Akin

Theory and Decision, 2023, vol. 94, issue 4, No 4, 637-676

Abstract: Abstract This paper theoretically and experimentally investigates the behavior of asymmetric players in guessing games. The asymmetry is created by introducing $$r>1$$ r > 1 replicas of one of the players. Two-player and restricted N-player cases are examined in detail. Based on the model parameters, the equilibrium is either unique in which all players choose zero or mixed in which the weak player ( $$r=1$$ r = 1 ) imitates the strong player ( $$r>1$$ r > 1 ). A series of experiments involving two and three-player repeated guessing games with unique equilibrium is conducted. We find that equilibrium behavior is observed less frequently and overall choices are farther from the equilibrium in two-player asymmetric games in contrast to symmetric games, but this is not the case in three-player games. Convergence towards equilibrium exists in all cases but asymmetry slows down the speed of convergence to the equilibrium in two, but not in three-player games. Furthermore, the strong players have a slight earning advantage over the weak players, and asymmetry increases the discrepancy in choices (defined as the squared distance of choices from the winning number) in both games.

Keywords: Guessing game; Asymmetry; Convergence; Game theory; Experimental economics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
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Working Paper: Asymmetric Guessing Games (2020)
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DOI: 10.1007/s11238-022-09908-6

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