The Nash bargaining solution: sometimes more utilitarian, sometimes more egalitarian

Shiran Rachmilevitch ()
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Shiran Rachmilevitch: University of Haifa, Mount Carmel

Theory and Decision, 2023, vol. 95, issue 3, No 5, 457-464

Abstract: Abstract The first-order condition of the Nash bargaining solution equates the ratio of utilities to the ratio of marginal utilities. It turns out that this common ratio plays a role in determining whether the Nash solution, roughly speaking, is “more utilitarian” or “more egalitarian.” More specifically, I propose a sense of proximity to utilitarianism and/or egalitarianism according to which, in bargaining problems with distinct utilitarian and egalitarian points, the Nash solution is closer to utilitarianism if the aforementioned ratio is smaller than one, and closer to egalitarianism if that ratio is greater than one.

Keywords: Bargaining; Nash solution; Egalitarianism; Utilitarianism (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
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DOI: 10.1007/s11238-023-09930-2

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