The leveling axiom

Alvaro Sandroni () and Leo Katz ()
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Alvaro Sandroni: Northwestern University
Leo Katz: University of Pennsylvania Law School

Theory and Decision, 2024, vol. 96, issue 1, No 6, 135-152

Abstract: Abstract We characterize general constraints under which rational choices are characterized by asymmetric revealed preferences. A key feature of our main characterization result is expressed by the leveling axiom. We also consider the special case of a law-abiding decision maker who chooses optimally among legal options. We show that the law does not necessarily satisfy the leveling axiom and, therefore, transitivity adds empirical content to law-abiding choices.

Keywords: Revealed preferences; Law (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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DOI: 10.1007/s11238-023-09943-x

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