On the existence of stable matchings with contracts

Yi-You Yang ()
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Yi-You Yang: Chung Yuan Christian University

Theory and Decision, 2025, vol. 98, issue 3, No 3, 367-372

Abstract: Abstract We generalize the notion of firm-quasi-stability to the framework of many-to-many matching with contracts under the irrelevance of rejected contracts and substitutability assumptions. We prove that a maximal element of the set of firm-quasi-stable allocations with respect to a partial order exists and is a stable allocation.

Keywords: Firm-quasi-stability; Stability; Matching with contracts; Irrelevance of rejected contracts; Substitutability (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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DOI: 10.1007/s11238-024-10013-z

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