Rank information and inequality in social welfare functions

Andreas Darmann (), Daniel Eckert () and Christian Klamler ()
Additional contact information
Andreas Darmann: University of Graz
Daniel Eckert: University of Graz
Christian Klamler: University of Graz

Theory and Decision, 2025, vol. 98, issue 4, No 1, 473-487

Abstract: Abstract In this paper we use rank information to construct a measure of preference satisfaction by collective decision rules and to compare the Borda rule with the plurality rule with respect to the inequality their outcome induces. While the construction of our measure of preference satisfaction is formally equivalent to Borda utilities, it turns out that, with respect to equality, the Borda rule is not necessarily superior to plurality rule for the case of more than three alternatives.

Keywords: Gini coefficient; Inequality; Borda; Plurality (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s11238-025-10023-5 Abstract (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kap:theord:v:98:y:2025:i:4:d:10.1007_s11238-025-10023-5

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer. ... ry/journal/11238/PS2

DOI: 10.1007/s11238-025-10023-5

Access Statistics for this article

Theory and Decision is currently edited by Mohammed Abdellaoui

More articles in Theory and Decision from Springer
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().