Power in plurality voting games

René Brink (), Dinko Dimitrov () and Agnieszka Rusinowska ()
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René Brink: VU University
Dinko Dimitrov: Saarland University
Agnieszka Rusinowska: CNRS, Centre d’Economie de la Sorbonne, Paris School of Economics

Theory and Decision, 2025, vol. 99, issue 1, No 14, 359-375

Abstract: Abstract Simple games in partition function form are used to model voting situations where a coalition being winning or losing might depend on the way players outside that coalition organize themselves. Such a game is called a plurality voting game if in every partition there is at least one winning coalition. In the present paper, we introduce an equal impact power index for this class of voting games and provide an axiomatic characterization. This power index is based on equal weight for every partition, equal weight for every winning coalition in a partition, and equal weight for each player in a winning coalition. Since some of the axioms we develop are conditioned on the power impact of losing coalitions becoming winning in a partition, our characterization heavily depends on a new result showing the existence of such elementary transitions between plurality voting games in terms of single embedded winning coalitions. The axioms restrict then the impact of such elementary transitions on the power of different types of players.

Keywords: Axiomatization; Power index; Plurality voting game; Winning coalition (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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DOI: 10.1007/s11238-025-10053-z

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