Forgiveness, cooperation, and present bias in the infinitely iterated Prisoner’s dilemma

Minwook Kang ()
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Minwook Kang: Korea University

Theory and Decision, 2025, vol. 99, issue 3, No 3, 573-591

Abstract: Abstract How does present bias affect the propensity to forgive or punish? To explore this question, we employ quasi-hyperbolic discounting within the iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma. The primary results from theoretical and simulation studies demonstrate that present bias impedes the sustainability of forgiving or lenient strategies (e.g., Tit-for-Tat with or without additional forgiveness, and Win-Stay, Lose-Shift) in a Nash equilibrium. However, this bias does not significantly impact the likelihood of sustaining cooperation for punitive strategies (e.g., the grim trigger).

Keywords: Present bias; Tit-for-tat; Forgiveness strategies; Iterated prisoner’s dilemma; Cooperation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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DOI: 10.1007/s11238-025-10029-z

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