International Coordinations as a Credible Commitment Device of Domestic Policy

Dong Geun Han
Additional contact information
Dong Geun Han: Yeungnam University

Korean Economic Review, 1995, vol. 11, issue 1, 17-33

Abstract: This paper claims that international monetary coordination eliminates credibility problem of domestic policy. Assuming that coordinative governments are the first movers, the paper shows that the international coordination is beneï¬ cial not only because externalities of non-coordinative policies are intemalized, but also because government credibility problem is resolved. The coordination itself provides an environment in which the government credibility problem is completely removed.

Date: 1995
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://keapaper.kea.ne.kr/RePEc/kea/keappr/KER-199512-11-1-02.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kea:keappr:ker-199512-11-1-02

Access Statistics for this article

Korean Economic Review is currently edited by Kyung Hwan Baik

More articles in Korean Economic Review from Korean Economic Association Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by KEA ().