Subjects in Experimental Bestshot Games Behave Like Case-Based Players

Youngse Kim
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Youngse Kim: Yonsei University

Korean Economic Review, 1997, vol. 13, issue 2, 23-38

Abstract: We reexamine subjects' behavior in the sequential best-shot game experiments. In our model, unrnodeled factors including rationality determine players' initial as-pirations and then a modified version of case—based learning process governs sub-sequent adaptations. The paper shows that "satisficing†can explain the actual subjects' adaptive behavior surprisingly welt Precisely, it is shown that the propor-tion of aggregate periods in which plays are consistent with satisficing ranges from 86.0 to 96.25 percent depending on the experimental treatment We also pro-vide an intuitive explanation of why subgame perfection is observed in the bestshot game but not in the ultimatum bargaining, albeit the similarity of equilibrium predictions.

Keywords: Subgame Perfect Equilibrium; Case-based Decision; Satisficing; Minimal Inconsistency; Minimal Imperfection (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1997
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