Subjects in Experimental Bestshot Games Behave Like Case-Based Players

Sang Chul Suh
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Sang Chul Suh: University of Windsor

Korean Economic Review, 1997, vol. 13, issue 2, 39-50

Abstract: In a division problem, where a finite number of agents own a finite number of goods to share, we are interested in implementing equitable and efficient solutions. We propose mechanisms which doubly implement the solutions in Nash and strong Nash equilibria. The mechanisms we propose are simple in the sense that they do not require each agent to report a list of preferencaes Each agent only reports a consumption bun-dle, a price vector, a unit vector, and an integer.

Keywords: Implementation; Nash equilibrium; Strong Nash equilibrium; No-envy; Efficiency (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D51 D78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1997
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