Capital Mobility, Tax Competition, and the Provision of an International Public Goods

Gangsun Rhee
Additional contact information
Gangsun Rhee: Chungnam Development Institution

Korean Economic Review, 1998, vol. 14, 115-133

Abstract: This paper studies how competition among the capital-importing countries (CIO's) to attract scarce foreign capital affects the provision of an internation-al public goods that has spillover effects to more than one country. We show that when the marginal cost to produce the public goods is different between the capital-exporting country (CEC) and the CIC's, the competition may have the CEC, where the cost to produce the public goods is higher than in the CIO's, provide the public goods We also show that even if the CEC can use a lump sum tax to provide the international public goods, the amount of the public goods may be below the optimal level in terms of world welfare Lastly, we briefly discuss the tax-crediting system as a possible solution to these two problems.

Keywords: Tax Competition; International Public Goods (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H4 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1998
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://keapaper.kea.ne.kr/RePEc/kea/keappr/KER-199806-14-1-07.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kea:keappr:ker-199806-14-1-07

Access Statistics for this article

Korean Economic Review is currently edited by Kyung Hwan Baik

More articles in Korean Economic Review from Korean Economic Association Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by KEA ().