The Social Cost of Monopoly with Asymmetric Lobbying Abilities

Jung Hoon Keem
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Jung Hoon Keem: Howon University

Korean Economic Review, 1998, vol. 14, 261-272

Abstract: The regulated monopoly price assumes the weighted average value of the monopoly price and the competitive market price. The weights are determined by the relative sizes of resources the monopolist and the consumers expend. The agents differ in their abilities of exerting political influences. We show that the consumers may lose by defending their surplus and that the consumers' surplus-defending efforts lead to either higher or lower social cost of monopoly.

Keywords: Social Cost of Monopoly; Regulated Monopoly Price; Asymmetric Lobbying Ability (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 L12 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1998
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