Different Levels of Noncooperative Tacit Collusion: An Empirical Test

In Kwon Lee
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In Kwon Lee: Korea Economic Research Institute

Korean Economic Review, 1999, vol. 15, 83-99

Abstract: This paper tests for the existence of different levels of noncooperative tacit collusion by exploiting almost same game environments of two markets, Dallas-Ft. Worth school milk market and San Antonio school milk market. The comparison of bidding strategies, bidding patterns over the bid season, average winning bids, and the incumbency premium in the DFW market with those in the San Antonio market verifies that different equilibria in the form of different levels of noncooperative tacit collusion can be supported in same game environments.

Keywords: Noncooperative Tacit Collusion; Repeated Game; Different Equilibria; Complementary Bidding; Incumbency Premium (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 L13 L40 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1999
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