Why Do or Do Not Nations Settle Their Disputes Bilaterally?: A Game-Theoretic Analysis of GATT Article XXII

Gi-Hong Kim
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Gi-Hong Kim: Korea Institute for Industrial Economics and Trade

Korean Economic Review, 1999, vol. 15, 213-233

Abstract: The aim of this paper is to analyze why nations do or do not settle their disputes bilaterally. This paper provides a strategic bargaining model, based on the framework of Reinganum and Wilde (1986). According to this model, delay benefit, industry characteristics, and reputation loss turn out to be important in the bilateral stage. Empirical evidence regarding industry characteristics and reputation loss is dissatisfactory because of insufficient data. This paper, however, strongly indicates that delay benefit is the most important factor in that most nations prefer to transfer their disputes into the multilateral stage.

Keywords: GATT; Bilateral Negotiations; Bargaining Model (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F13 K41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1999
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