Should We Wait for a New Technology?

Kisang Lee and Hyun Park
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Kisang Lee: Sejong University
Hyun Park: Sejong University

Korean Economic Review, 2001, vol. 17, 127-147

Abstract: This paper shows the mechanism of technology dissemination when two rival firms decide timings of either international adoption or domestic imitation for a newly available technology. The set of optimal strategies for a dynamic Nash game includes immediate (but, not delayed) simultaneous international adoption; and sequential decisions for technology dissemination. The paper also illustrates that there is no technology adoption and whereby this waiting problem is due to the usual structure of contingent profits and costs of dissemination in a duopolistic market. Therefore the paper explains that the rivalry and strategic behaviors cause a slow and incremental process for dissemination of emerging technologies.

Keywords: strategic timing decision; waiting game problem; technology imitation and diffusion (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D43 O33 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2001
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