Why Do Nations Behave Strategically?: A Game Theoretic Analysis of GATT Article 23

Gi-Hong Kim
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Gi-Hong Kim: Korea Institute for Industrial Economics and Trade

Korean Economic Review, 2002, vol. 18, 129-157

Abstract: The purpose of this paper is to explain why nations behave strategically in the multilateral stage of GATT dispute settlement procedures. We provide two game models: One is a complete information model and the other, an incomplete information model. We show the following points: First, national size is important in explaining the nation's ex -post behaviors in the multilateral stage. Second, reputation loss is also important. Third, industry characteristics are not important. Some empirical evidence including the regression analysis is provided. As a conclusion, it is shown that the most important factor is the reputation loss accompanying unauthorized retaliation.

Keywords: GATT; dispute settlement procedures; reputation loss (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F13 K41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2002
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