Credible Judiciary and Welfare Systems

Kookshin Ahn, Taesung Kim and Gyu Ho Wang
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Kookshin Ahn: Chung-Ang University
Taesung Kim: Seoul National University
Gyu Ho Wang: Sogang University

Korean Economic Review, 2003, vol. 19, 249-257

Abstract: If the "haves" perceive that their charity will rebound to their advantage indirectly, or prevent the economic environment from deteriorating, then they may find it advantageous to act as if they were benevolent. Then, a certain type of benevolence is a disguised pursuit of self-interest. This paper attempts to provide a self-interest based explanation for seemingly altruistic behavior. In particular, it develops a simple model of judiciary and welfare systems based upon self-interest. It first explains the existence of the welfare systems without assuming altruism, and the fact that crime is committed more often than not and that actual punishment of the crime seems always less than the optimal punishment level preventing the crime, assuming that crime is socially inefficient and can be prevented.

Keywords: Pursuit of Self-interest; Altruistic Behavior; Judiciary and Welfare System (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 I30 K40 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2003
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