Cooperation In Heterogeneous Population

Sawoong Kang
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Sawoong Kang: Handong Global University

Korean Economic Review, 2004, vol. 20, 53-73

Abstract: This paper analyzes a heterogeneous population in which selfish players and fair players are spatially distributed, and they are randomly and repeatedly matched to play a prisoner's dilemma. Players are assumed to behave in a myopic manner. By introducing the random experimentation of fair players, we show that the system described by a Markov process converges to a best possible equilibrium in the long run. Simulation results show that the structure of interactions plays an important role in determining the long-run cooperation rate.

Keywords: Heterogeneous Population; Myopic Best Response; Random Experimentation; Long-run Equilibrium; Interaction Structure (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C7 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004
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