Political Optimal Tax Policy Making in a Probabilistic Voting Framework

Sung-kyu Lee
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Sung-kyu Lee: HanKuk University of Foreign Studies

Korean Economic Review, 2006, vol. 22, 99-129

Abstract: Tax policy in democratic socities can best be understood as the equilibrium outcome of a political process that trades off economic and political forces within a given set of institutions. We use a probabilistic voting framework to analyze the structure of tax policy in political equilibrium. Among available models, the probabilistic voting or expected vote maximization model appears well suited to deal with tax structure in a democratic setting. In particular, we apply the probabilistic voting model to tax policy making, focusing on analyzing the outcome of vote maximization.

Keywords: Probabilistic voting model; Political costs; political optimal tax structure; Tax illusion (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 D78 H20 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006
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