Linkages Between Patent Protection and Strategic R&D Policy: Case of the Exogeneous Regime of IPR Protection

Moonsung Kang
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Moonsung Kang: Korea University

Korean Economic Review, 2008, vol. 24, 367-382

Abstract: This paper explores strategic R&D policy when countries�� regimes on protection of intellectual property rights (IPR) are exogenously given under the multilaterally agreed disciplines. Under the weak enforcement regime, domestic and foreign R&D activities are strategic complements rather than strategic substitutes and hence R&D reaction curves are upward sloping. Government wishes to subsidize its domestic firm��s R&D in the presence of sufficiently weak IPR protection, because it is able to encourage R&D by the foreign rival firm, and greater R&D investment of foreign rivals increases the profits of the domestic firm.

Keywords: Strategic Trade Policy; R&D Subsidies; Intellectual Property Rights (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F12 F13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008
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