The Dynamics of Parliamentary Bargaining and the Vote of Confidence

Seok-ju Cho
Additional contact information
Seok-ju Cho: Kyung Hee University

Korean Economic Review, 2023, vol. 39, 277-314

Abstract: I develop a dynamic model of parliamentary policymaking in which three parties bargain over two-dimensional policies and transferable benefits. The model captures an important aspect of parliamentary systems: a failure of critical legislation leads to government dissolution. Policies are continuing, so the policy outcome in a period becomes the status quo for the next. I find a Markov perfect equilibrium in undominated strategies for sufficiently patient political parties. In the equilibrium, once a government forms, it is never dissolved. The policy dynamics under the consensus coalition and minimal winning coalitions exhibit strong persistence and Pareto-efficiency among governmental parties. By contrast, under minority governments, the policy outcome oscillates between two points that do not belong to the Pareto set. In the government formation processes, only minimal winning coalitions are formed with positive probability, and a party that is disadvantaged by the status quo policy is likely to be included in the government.

Keywords: Dynamic Bargaining; Vote of Confidence; Parliamentary Democracy; Government Formation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C73 D72 D78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://keapaper.kea.ne.kr/RePEc/kea/keappr/KER-20230101-39-1-10.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kea:keappr:ker-20230101-39-1-10

Access Statistics for this article

Korean Economic Review is currently edited by Kyung Hwan Baik

More articles in Korean Economic Review from Korean Economic Association Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by KEA ().