Political Economy and Social Welfare with Voting Procedure

Jamal Nazrul Islam, Dr Haradhan Mohajan () and Pahlaj Moolio
Additional contact information
Jamal Nazrul Islam: Research Centre for Mathematical and Physical Sciences, University of Chittagong, Chittagong

KASBIT Business Journals (KBJ), 2009, vol. 2, 42-66

Abstract: Mathematical Economics, Social Science and Political Science are inter-related. In this paper, an attempt has been made to describe aspects of these subjects by introducing examples, definitions, mathematical calculations and discussions. Game Theory is included in this paper to study mathematical models in economics and political science especially to study Nash equilibrium. Success and failure of democracy are interpreted as different equilibria of a dynamic political game with cost of changing leadership. Unitary democracy can be frustrated when voters do not replace corrupt leaders. Federal democracy cannot be consistently frustrated at both national and provincial levels. Arrow?s theorem indicates that the aggregate of individuals? preferences will not satisfy transitivity, indifference to irrelevant alternatives and nondictatorship, simultaneously to enable one of the individuals becomes a dictator. In this paper both social welfare functions and social choice correspondence are considered in economical environments.

Keywords: Preference Relation; Pure and Mixed Strategies; Nash Equilibrium; Social Choice; unitary and Federal Democracy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H71 H72 H73 H80 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (36)

Downloads: (external link)
http://kasbit.edu.pk/KBJVol2/42-66.%20Political%20 ... 0Pahlaj%20Moolio.pdf

Related works:
Working Paper: Political Economy and Social Welfare with Voting Procedure (2009)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ksb:journl:v:2:y:2009:p:42-66

Access Statistics for this article

KASBIT Business Journals (KBJ) is currently edited by Syed Karamatullah Hussainy

More articles in KASBIT Business Journals (KBJ) from Khadim Ali Shah Bukhari Institute of Technology (KASBIT) Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Yasir Jaseem ( this e-mail address is bad, please contact ).