Should We Cut on the Executive in Order to Save the Constitutional State?

Krzysztof Waśniewski ()

Turkish Economic Review, 2016, vol. 3, issue 2, 341-348

Abstract: Constitutional states, as a separate category of social structures, are progressively losing their economic power, as measured with their capacity to appropriate the available capital stock. Fiscal policies, and the corresponding institutions of public finance, play a significant role in the public appropriation of capital, both through direct redistribution and indirect incentives to private allocation. Policies evolve into institutions after experimentation, yet, as a species, we are not really good at experimenting with our own social structures. The case of New Zealand and their public reforms shows an interesting path, possibly to follow, so as to increase the capacity of experimenting with fiscal policies – and to devise more efficient institutions - through enhanced fiscal prerogatives of the legislative in comparison to the executive.

Keywords: Institutional economics; Political economy; Fiscal policy. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H11 H30 H60 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
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