¿Puede existir el bien común? El teorema de la imposibilidad de Arrow y la nueva democracia colombiana

Hugo Lopez Castaño

Lecturas de Economía, 1991, issue 34, 9-38

Abstract: Colombia has recently approved a new constitution. It constitutes the ultimate expression of the liberal ideal: the same way the free market policy, throught increasing the degree of competition, must guarantee an adequate supply of private goods, it is expected that an open and participative democracy, that allows a greater control of citizens on community affairs, will ensure a more reasonable supply of public goods. This ideal will face serious difficulties. Public well being doesn't automatically rise after new elections. This statement can be proved by the paradox revealed by the election process or by Arrow's impossibility theorem, as discussed in this article. Democracy is according to Churchill's expression, "the worst form of government with the exception of all other known forms". Therefore, it doesn't lack certain difficulties. It is built upon the conflict's logic, which tries to regulate it, but definitely doesn't eliminate it (civil war is always a virtual possibility).

Keywords: Teorema de Arrow; democracia; Constitución Colombiana (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1991
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