Grupos de interés y regulación ambiental en Colombia: el caso de los recursos hídricos
Medardo Restrepo Patiño ()
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Medardo Restrepo Patiño: Universidad de Antioquia, Postal: Calle 67 No. 53-108 (Ciudad Universitaria) Bloque 13, oficina 110 Medellín. Colombia
Lecturas de Economía, 2006, issue 65, 143-176
Abstract:
Resorting to the menu auctions model developed by Grossman–Helpman (1994) and combining the interest groups models of Aidt (1997 and 1998), Fredriksson–Gaston (2000) and Becker (1983 and 1985) this article shows the effects that different interests have over the performance of the economic instrument (pollution tax) used in Colombia for the control of pollution in water bodies. Whenever differences exist among the influences of various interests different pollution levels will be obtained; which will be the best for the most influential groups but not so for society as a whole. Only when influences are balanced the resulting pollution levels will approach those socially efficient
Keywords: environmental regulation; interest groups; menu auctions; common agency; pigouvian tax (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D78 D86 Q53 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:lde:journl:y:2006:i:65:p:143-176
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