Alianzas y política: un juego entre agentes civiles y armados

Maria Castillo () and Boris Salazar ()

Lecturas de Economía, 2007, issue 67, 71-98

Abstract: Illegal armed agents try to replace the state both in the monopoly of violence and in the protection of civilian population. We pretend to show that this objective is achieved if armed agents build alliances with groups from the civilian population. How to build this type of alliances? We propose a formal exercise, represented by a game, where an armed agent and a civilian one update their decisions concerning the relevance of already established alliances. Necessary and sufficient conditions for stability of alliances are derived from the results of our model.

Keywords: game theory; alliances (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D74 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://revistas.udea.edu.co/index.php/lecturasdeeconomia/issue/view/225 (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Alianzas y política: un juego entre agentes civiles y armados (2007)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:lde:journl:y:2007:i:67:p:71-98

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
Lecturas de Economía, Departamento de Economía, Calle 67, 53-108, Medellin 050010, Colombia.

Access Statistics for this article

Lecturas de Economía is currently edited by Carlos Andrés Vasco Correa

More articles in Lecturas de Economía from Universidad de Antioquia, Departamento de Economía Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Carlos Andrés Vasco Correa ().