On local democracies in the Colombian Pacific and their incidence in public policy regarding potable water during the period 2008-2011

Andrés Cendales (), Jhon Mora Rodriguez () and José Arroyo
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Andrés Cendales: Universidad Católica de Colombia

Lecturas de Economía, 2015, issue 83, 161-192

Abstract: Using a generalized ordered probit model, we offer statistical evidence in favor of the political economy thesis. This thesis states that government parties in power group-led precarious democracies, in which drug trafficking and clientelism are allies and seek to co-opt government at the local level, systematically undermine the quality of public policy. We choose the potable water sector in the Colombian Pacific because local democracies in this region, besieged by clientelistic structures linked to drug trafficking, have shown a logic of electoral and government behavior consistent with theory

Keywords: public policy on potable water; public resource predation; precarious democracies; sub-national analysis (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C1 H1 H4 H7 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:lde:journl:y:2015:i:83:p:161-192

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DOI: 10.17533/udea.le.n83a06

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