An asymmetric job auction model

Xiaoting Wang ()
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Xiaoting Wang: Department of Economics, Acadia University , Wolfville, Nova Scotia, B4P 2R6, Canada

Journal of Economic and Financial Studies (JEFS), 2015, vol. 3, issue 5, 53-62

Abstract: In this paper we investigate a labor market with search frictions. Workers with heterogeneous productivity apply to different types of job vacancies by bidding the optimal profits that they can offer the firms. In the steady state equilibrium, the most capable workers separate themselves by only bidding at jobs requiring high skills, while applicants in the middle of the productivity distribution pool with the low-productivity workers and apply for jobs requiring low skills.

Keywords: Heterogeneity; Job auction; Steady state equilibrium. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D83 E24 J64 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:lrc:lareco:v:3:y:2015:i:5:p:53-62

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