Portfolio Management and Appropriation of Private Benefits of Control

Elli Kraizberg ()
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Elli Kraizberg: School of Business, Bar Ilan University, Ramat Gan 52900, Israel.

Journal of Business, 2016, vol. 1, issue 1, 60-72

Abstract: In many countries around the globe, portfolio managers utilize well-accepted models, assuming that a partial stake of ownership is proportionally valued. This assumption is incorrect in markets in which traded firms or publicly held firms are controlled by major owners who would take any possible measure to protect and maintain a 'lock' on control, so they can secure a sellable asset to another control seeker. In this case, estimation of key parameters such as, volatility, expected returns and diversification effect, may be grossly distorted. We would argue that a major trigger for the value of the benefits of control is the ability of control owners to transfer assets from their own portfolio to a controlled publicly traded firm. While it is obvious that these transfers will take place, if and only if, it is beneficial to the control owners, the impact on the minor shareholders may not necessarily be negative and may vary depending on several parameters. This paper models a specific drive on the part of control seekers who, in addition to their stake in a publicly traded firm, own a private portfolio. It could be argued that they may 'transfer' inferior investments to the public firms that they control exploiting less than perfect transparency. However, while they own this valuable option of 'transferring' inferior investments into the public firm, these actions may still be beneficial to the minority shareholders. A simulation procedure that are applied to several cases in which transfers are made in exchange for cash or equity, instances of full disclosure or partial transparency, the likelihood that the control owners' actions will be contested in court, level of risk, and other parameters.

Keywords: Benefits of Control; portfolio management; Efficient transfer. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G32 K4 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
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