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POLITICAL ACCOUNTABILITY OF THE GOVERNMENT AND ITS MEMBERS - THEORETICAL ASPECTS

Gabriel Ciprian Ungureanu ()
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Gabriel Ciprian Ungureanu: Lecturer PhD., Associate professor, Phd., University ,,Stefan cel Mare” Suceava, Romania

European Journal of Law and Public Administration, 2016, vol. 3, issue 2, 53-57

Abstract: According to the legal framework, any validated dignitary in his office is held to politically answer to his mandates, namely the people. The delegation of the executive function by the people implies the assumption of the joint political opinion by the entire executive group and not individually. Under this concept, the constitutional texts regulate the institution of the Government on two legal levels, one belonging to the constitutional law and the other one belonging to the administrative law. According to the first role, the Government is a promoter of political decisions, which also defines the political responsibility, and in the second instance, the Government appears as the administrator of the central public affairs. This paper is a summary of what we call the governmental concept of political accountability.

Keywords: Democratic government; political opinion; assuming the political accountability (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: A23 K10 K19 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
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