Finding Footing in a Postmodern Conception of Law (English version)

Bryan Druzin ()
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Bryan Druzin: BA, LLB, LLM, PhD candidate, King's College London, Lecturer in law, Brunel University Uxbridge, UB8 3PH, United Kingdom

Postmodern Openings, 2012, vol. 3, issue 1, 41-56

Abstract: The following jurisprudence paper examines the implications of postmodern thought upon our conception of law. In this paper I argue that, despite the absolute, all-consuming moral relativism towards which postmodernism seems to lead in its most extreme form, its acceptance in fact in no way undermines the possibility of finding solid ground for our legal principles. This paper contends that moral objectivity can be found in the individual experience of suffering generated by these very subjective concoctions. Subjective concoctions or not, they are real in that they imbue a sense of value into conditions, and may thus serve as foundational principles for law. While our value systems are stripped of all claim to objective authority, ultimately, all postmodernism does is force us to set aside our larger concepts of “justice,” and instead root our legal conceptions at this far more fundamental level of human experience.

Keywords: Postmodernism; moral relativism; law; objective standards; utilitarianism (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: A23 K39 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
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