Mobilterminierung im Wettbewerb

Kruse Jörn ()
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Kruse Jörn: Helmut Schmidt Universität, Institut für Wirtschaftspolitik, Holstenhofweg 85, 22043 Hamburg

Review of Economics, 2009, vol. 60, issue 1, 1-16

Abstract: The regulatory agencies found mobile termination to be monopolistic and adopted a policy of ex ante price regulation in recent years. This paper discusses two structural alternatives putting mobile termination under competitive pressure. The first one is the “receiving-party-pays-principle” where mobile termination is a part of the service bundle puchased by the mobile customer. The second is the proposal of a “mobile termination competition”. It turns mobile termination into a specific competitive market and looks like the optimal economic answer to the mobile termination problem. It works on the consumer as well as on the wholesale level.

Date: 2009
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DOI: 10.1515/roe-2009-0101

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