Zur Reform des Rating-(Un)Wesens: Bestandsaufnahme und eine Reform-Option
Beck Hanno () and
Wienert Helmut ()
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Beck Hanno: Hochschule Pforzheim, Fakultät für Wirtschaft und Recht, Tiefenbronner Straße 65, D-75175 Pforzheim
Wienert Helmut: Hochschule Pforzheim, Fakultät für Wirtschaft und Recht, Tiefenbronner Straße 65, D-75175 Pforzheim
Review of Economics, 2010, vol. 61, issue 1, 45-67
Abstract:
The market for ratings suffers from several inefficiencies: asymmetric information and moral hazard lead to conflicts of interest and principal-agent-problems. Moreover, network externalities and economies of scale lead to a lack of competition in the market for ratings. There is empirical evidence for market inefficiencies as ratingshopping, herding or slow adjustment of wrong ratings to a changed environment. As a remedy for these problems, we suggest a fund where rating-orders are pooled and rated by means of a double-blind-approach. Each issuer of a security gives his product into a pool and rating agencies which meet the standards of the pool are free to tender for the mandate to rate the product. Several aspects how to set up such a pool and possible problems are being addressed in this paper.
Date: 2010
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:lus:reveco:v:61:y:2010:i:1:p:45-67
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DOI: 10.1515/roe-2010-0103
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