Dynamics of Military Conflict: an Economics Perspective

Klaus Beckmann and Reimer Lennart

Review of Economics, 2014, vol. 65, issue 2, 193-215

Abstract: This paper is concerned with methods for analysing patterns of conflict. We survey dynamic games, differential games, and simulation as alternative ways of extending the standard static economic model of conflict to study patterns of conflict dynamics, giving examples for each type of model. It turns out that computational requirements and theoretical difficulties impose tight limits on what can be achieved using the first two approaches. In particular, we appear to be forced to model the outcome of conflict as being decided in a single final confrontation if we employ non-linear contest success functions. A simulation study based on a new model of adaptive, boundedly rational decision making, however, is shown not to be subject to this limitation. Plausible patterns of conflict dynamics emerge, which we can link to both historical conflict and standard tenets of military theory.

Keywords: conflict dynamics; contest; success functions; differential games; dynamic games; simulation; emergence of war (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
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Working Paper: Dynamics of Military Conflict: an Economics Perspective (2014)
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DOI: 10.1515/roe-2014-0205

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