 What do we Know About Lobbying in Germany?Review of Economics, 2020, vol. 71, issue 1, 43-79 Abstract: Contribution payments and information are two important channels of lobbying influence. This survey analyzes what is known about these channels in Germany from a political economy perspective. Based on a discussion of the empirical literature and the available data, I argue that the state of empirical knowledge about lobbying in Germany is rather limited. To improve our understanding of the lobbying process, I identify research gaps and discuss potential methodological approaches which can be suitable to address these questions. Also, I discuss the role of party donations and temporary employment of bureaucratic staff, based on two novel data sets. The analysis indicates that party donations might play a role as a means to achieve access; in contrast, the temporary exchange of employees in the public administration seems to be of rather less importance in informational lobbying. Keywords: lobbying; interest groups; political economy; economics and law (search for similar items in EconPapers) Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:lus:reveco:v:71:y:2020:i:1:p:43-79:n:2 Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from Access Statistics for this article Review of Economics is currently edited by Michael Berlemann More articles in Review of Economics from De Gruyter |
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